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FREEZING THE COMPANY CHARTER
ERICKADES*

When legislatures alter corporate, partnership, and other business
entity statutes, they simultaneously amend the governing document
of all entities of that type formed within the jurisdiction. In many
circumstances these business entities may wish to retain existing
rules for internal governance. This Article offers a novel tool for
firms wishing to so manage their own legal transitions: the
"charter freeze." A freeze provision in the company charter
declares that future (non-mandatory) changes in relevant statutes
have no effect on the firm. Owners may affirmatively adopt the
new rules, but choose to exercise complete control over their
adoption vel non of legal innovation. This Article argues that
current law permits a firm to adopt charter freezes and
demonstrates situations in which freezes are socially desirable.
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INTRODUCTION

Whenever a legislature amends a state's corporation,
partnership, or other business entity1 statute, it simultaneously
amends the charter2 of each and every such firm in the jurisdiction.
While this state of affairs often surprises and disturbs those observers
uninitiated to corporate law, it follows from the primary justification
for devoting state resources to business entity law. Modem company
law theory views most provisions of corporate, partnership, and other
entity laws merely as off-the-rack enabling rules for internal
governance, which most firms would adopt if they considered each
issue.3 Enabling rules are default rules that apply to companies that
choose not to adopt alternative provisions.4 Public promulgation of
1. This Article uses "company" as shorthand for "business entity"; thus, company
denotes a corporation, a partnership, a limited partnership, a limited liability partnership,
a limited liability company, a business trust, or any other business entity.
2. This Article uses "charter" to denote the foundational document of all types of
business organizations. In common parlance, there are distinct names for each-e.g.,
partnership agreements for partnerships, articles of organization for limited liability
companies. The assertion that statutory amendments alter existing charters is not merely
a characterization of effect; the leading corporate code states that "(t]his [statute] and all
amendments thereof shall be a part of the charter or certificate of incorporation of every
corporation." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (1991 & Supp. 1998); see also REVISED UNIF.
P'SfllP Acr § 103, 6 U.L.A. 16 (1995 & Supp. 2000) ("To the extent the partnership
agreement does not otherwise provide, this [Act] governs relations among the partners
...."); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr § 103, 6A U.L.A. 435 (1995 & Supp. 2000) (using
language virtually identical to the Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 103).
3. See infra note 40 and accompanying text; see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 34 (1991)
("[C]orporate law is a set of terms available off-the-rack so that participants in corporate
ventures can save the cost of contracting.").
4. The exceptional areas are those in which company laws include mandatory rulesrules from which companies cannot opt out. See infra Parts III.B, III.C (discussing rules
designed to protect third parties and to facilitate contracting within the firm). Focusing
mainly on intra-firm enabling rules comports with the modem view that company law
principally addresses contractual issues within the business entity. Thus, the law of public
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widely-preferred default rules saves business entities the time and
cost of re-inventing desirable internal business governance rules. As
long as the legislature does its job, most firms will invite the continual
stream of statutory amendments that alter their charters.
Even if the legislature always properly selects default (enabling)
rules, firms with uncommon preferences will opt out of some of the
statutory defaults. Voting, however, is an imperfect device for
owners desiring to opt out of statutory changes. It is expensive and
poses significant collective action problems.5 Further, amending the
firm's charter may require a supermajority vote, giving a minority the
benefit of new statutory rules for which they never could have
mustered sufficient votes.
This Article suggests a novel device for firms wary of legislative
innovation-a freeze provision declaring that non-mandatory
amendments to the company's statute have no effect on the firm's
internal rules of governance until adopted by an affirmative vote.
Freeze provisions enable firms to reject all legislative innovation in
enabling rules ex ante. If legislatures regularly select suboptimal
default rules, a freeze provision may become attractive to firms
beyond those with unusual preferences. Entities worried about
amendments to specific statutory enabling provisions might adopt
limited versions, freezing out only the relevant code sections.6
Given the current flux in many areas of business entity law, the
potential for freeze provisions is particularly relevant. Over the last
twenty-five years, corporate law has changed significantly on a
number of important issues? In the near future, many states may
corporations deals with those rules "that primarily govern the relationship between a
company's managers and investors." Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 547 (1990). Analogously, most
other business entity law (e.g., close corporations, partnerships, and limited liability
companies), where owners are managers, primarily deals with relations among the owners.
5. For a cogent summary of these problems with shareholder democracy, see
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW§ 9.5, at 389-400 (1986); see also JESSE H.
CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 521-28 (4th ed. 1995)
(discussing, inter alia, "rational apathy" and "free rider" problems in corporate
democracy); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 171-72 (discussing problems
with shareholder monitoring); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89
MICH. L. REv. 520 passim (1990) (same).
6. Limited freezes may fail to prevent change effectively because creative scriveners
can usually find ways to sidestep the restriction. See infra text accompanying notes 140-42
(describing the difficulty of making a partial freeze effective against creative
draftsmanship).
7. Delaware and many other states have made directors' and managers' duty of care
waiveable in the charter. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10) (West 1990); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991 & Supp. 1999). Similarly, both statutes and case law on
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replace the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) with a recently
promulgated revised statute, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
(RUPA).8 Limited liability company (LLC) statutes, providing
default rules for an entity that did not exist twenty-five years ago,
continue to evolve rapidly. 9 Part I begins this Article's analysis by
discussing why transitions in business entity law's enabling rules differ
from transitions in other mandatory areas of law. Part II argues that,
although debatable, existing law likely does not prohibit charter
freezes. Part III assesses the policy arguments for and against the
freeze. Finally, after explaining why conventional normative analysis
of transitions does not apply to enabling bodies of law,10 this Article
demonstrates that none of the reasons for mandatory rules of
business entity law justify a mandatory rule against charter freezes. 11
The desirability of the freeze for public companies12 depends on
whether their state of incorporation is engaged in a "race to the top"
permissible defensive measures in the face of a hostile takeover offer has changed
significantly. See, e.g., Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151-55
(Del. 1990) (refining the Unocal standard); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 955-56 (Del. 1985) (permitting defensive measures only if proportional to some threat
to the corporation or its shareholders). In the wake of the Supreme Court's approval of
some anti-takeover statutes, C.T.S. Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 70-71
(1987) (finding Indiana's control share acquisition statute constitutonal), most states now
have comprehensive anti-takeover legislation. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991 &
Supp. 1998); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 2000). The standard
for reviewing decisions on derivative suits by special litigation committees continues to
evolve. Compare Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981)
(requiring the court to apply its own independent business judgment, in addition to
examining independence and good faith of a special litigation committee, in deciding
whether or not to uphold committee decisions), with Hirsch v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 984
P.2d 629, 638 (Colo. 1999) (requiring the trial court to give deference to the special
committee if it finds that the committee was disinterested, independent, and employed
reasonable procedures in its analysis).
8. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr, 6 U.L.A 1-124 (1995 & Supp. 2000). The Revised Act was
promulgated in 1993. As of 2000, twenty-six of the fifty states had adopted it. 6 id. at 1
tbl.
9. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws &
Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 947, 951-52 (1995) (tracing significant
changes in limited liability company (LLC) law throughout the country between 1991 and
1995).
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra Part III.B, III. C.
12. In addition to corporations with widespread (public) ownership, some limited
partnerships and other business entities qualify as public companies. Limited partnerships
"may have up to several hundred limited partners ... who ... do not expect to participate
actively in management." CHOPER ET AL., supra note 5, at 690. Joint stock associations
and business trusts are other business entities that may possess the key attribute of a
public corporation-a relatively large number of owners uninvolved in the operation of
the business. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 109-25 (3d ed. 1983).
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favoring shareholders, or a "race to the bottom" favoring
management. In a race to the top world, a charter freeze protects
management from amendments likely to favor shareholders, and
hence is undesirable. Conversely, in a race to the bottom world, the
freeze performs the desirable task of preventing management from
obtaining rules that they cannot obtain by shareholder voteY Public
companies and privately-held businesses alike may find the freeze
useful if the legal profession possesses enough influence to pass
business entity rules that generate excessive planning and litigation
fees. To the extent general corporate law focuses on public
corporations, close corporations will find the freeze useful in keeping
irrelevant or positively harmful statutory innovations out of their
charters.
Widespread use of the freeze would result in a much more
heterogeneous company-law landscape-contemporaneous entity
statutes would not apply to firms that had "frozen in" superceded
laws. Recent work on network and learning externalities strongly
suggests that it is efficient to offer firms a wider choice of law for
internal governance, and, thus, that worries about this possible
fragmentation of company law are misplaced. 14 Although many of
the grounds for permitting the freeze also weigh in favor of making it
the default rule for company legal transitions, there is a paradox-the
more desirable the freeze, the less likely lawmakers will be to choose
it as the default transition rule. 15
I. THE SPECIAL NATURE OF ENABLING TRANSffiONS &
IMPLICATIONS FOR FREEZING

In almost every other area of law, legal transitions are
mandatory. The legislatures and courts dictate whether a new rule
will be fully retroactive or whether to provide some form of transition
relief (such as grandfathering pre-existing activity at odds with the
new rule or providing actors a window of time to comply with the new
rule). People can, of course, try to anticipate and plan for legal
change-expected taxes depress the price of targeted assets and
expected zoning changes alter the price of affected parcels.16 Private
13. See infra Part III.D.
14. See infra Part III.E.
15. See infra Part III.F.
16. The technical word for such planning is "capitalization": actors factor all
conceivable risks and rewards into the prices they pay for assets. For an accessible but
penetrating discussion of capitalization in the context of tax shelters, see Boris I. Bittker,
Tax Shelters and Tax Capitalization or Does the Early Bird Get a Free Lunch?, in
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parties, however, can do nothing to alter the transition rules chosen
by lawmakers. Indeed, permitting private parties prospectively to opt
out of changes in tax, zoning, and most other types of laws would
defeat the purpose of legal change and lock in the status quo forever.
This is not so for company law transitions. There is no question
that a company can effectively freeze its charter on a specific (nonmandatory) issue simply by including a charter provision on point.
For example, consider Acme Corporation's requirement of an eighty
percent vote to consummate a merger in a state where the default
rule is a two-thirds vote. If the legislature amends the statutory
default to a simple majority, the internal rules of firms without a
charter provision on point change. Acme, however, is unaffected: its
eighty percent requirement trumps future as well as present statutory
defaults. Generally, firms adopting specific charter provisions varying
from statutory defaults effectively freeze out all future legal
transitions on that particular issue. 17
Freezing the entire charter, then, is redundant protection from
legal change for those matters controlled by specific charter
provisions. It is not by any means, however, a fruitless transition tool.
Including a specific charter provision on every issue is expensive and
undermines the entire purpose of business entity statutes-saving
firms the cost of re-inventing sound rules for internal governance.
For the multitude of issues on which a company's charter is silent, a
general freeze prevents legislative action from changing the
company's rules. For example, assume that Acme had no specific
charter provision on merger votes, but did have a provision freezing
its charter against all legal change. After the legislature changed the
default required merger vote from two-thirds to a simple majority,
Acme would retain the old two-thirds rule. 18
COLLECTED LEGAL ESSAYS 547, 547-52 (Boris I. Bittker ed., 1989).
17. Under a provision in Pennsylvania's corporate code, however, firms wishing to
freeze out statutory changes cannot simply include a cite to an existing code section.
Pennsylvania mandates adoption of newly enacted rules by firms whose charters cite
specific statutory provisions: "A reference in the articles or bylaws or other organic
documents of an association to any provision of law supplied or repealed by this title shall
be deemed to be a reference to the superceding provision of this title." 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 101(c) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000). This rule is likely suboptimal.
Incorporators who take the time and effort to cite explicitly a default rule that would
govern them if their charter remained silent on the issue likely find the cited rule of
particular importance. This is strong evidence that the incorporators would reject any
change to the statutory default rule.
18. A more subtle case arises if lawmakers amend the company statute from silence
on a particular issue to some default rule. Specific provisions in company charters will
trump whatever new default is enacted. If the charter of a company with a general freeze
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Without discussing positive legality or normative merits, it is
important to note that freezing entire company charters does not
frustrate the purpose of company law-choosing default rules desired
by most firms. 19 As long as lawmakers do their job effectively, the
plurality of companies will not want to freeze their charters. Further,
freezes adopted by other firms have no obvious impact on the
plurality.20 Thus, private choices of transition rules do not undermine
the purpose of company law.
Although the majority of company laws are enabling, there are a
few mandatory company laws. These include taxation and rules
governing relationships with third parties. Just as in the noncompany law context, allowing firms to plan around or opt out of
transitions to mandatory rules may undermine the policy behind the
law.21 No problem arises, however, for transitions from mandatory to
enabling laws.22 Such transitions do raise some interesting issues and
surprising results.
If a charter contains a general freeze when the legislature
replaces a mandatory rule with an enabling rule (or simply erases the
mandatory rule), strict construction of the freeze dictates that the firm
will retain the pre-existing mandatory rule. For example, imagine
that Beta Corporation had a charter freeze and was governed by a
state statute mandating that two-thirds of all shareholders approve
mergers. If the legislature subsequently abolished the supermajority
has no relevant provision, however, the effect of the new statutory default is unclear.
While the firm's freeze evidences an intent to reject all legal change, the firm had no preexisting rule on point since there was originally no statutory default. Because there is no
old rule to retain, arguably the only possible choice is the new statutory default.
19. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (describing the enabling nature of
company law).
20. Part III.E infra considers in greater detail whether freezes by some companies can
have a negative effect on other companies and concludes that such effects are minimal or
nonexistent.
21. It is also possible that the new mandatory rule may disrupt existing company
arrangements; in such cases "it may be appropriate to make the new provision binding
only on firms that affirmatively elect to be governed by it." Larry E. Ribstein, Changing
Statutory Forms, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 11, 29 (1997) [hereinafter Ribstein,
Statutory Forms]. Although the very policy reasons supporting the freeze, see infra Part
III, buttress this view, reserved power clauses included in most business entity statutes
give states virtually plenary power to alter existing company charters by statutory
amendment. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (1991 & Supp. 1998) ("This chapter
may be amended or repealed, at the pleasure of the legislature ... all amendments thereof
shall be a part of the charter or certificate of incorporation of every corporation ....").
22. Third parties may object to the elimination of mandatory rules designed for their
protection, and the very possibility of repeal may undermine the value of mandatory rules
as a means for firms to bond-i.e., commit to perform some acts and forego others.
Ribstein, Statutory Forms, supra note 21, at 26-27.
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requirement, Beta arguably would retain the two-thirds requirement.
This result may seem surprising and counterintuitive. To the extent.
however, that a given mandatory rule imposes costs without benefits
on firms, there may be grounds to infer that a company did not intend
to freeze the mandatory rule into its charter. In any event, companies
can make their preferences explicit by including a clause in their
freeze provision declaring the desire to free themselves of any (or
some) repealed mandatory rules.
The repeal of a mandatory company law may revive charter
provisions that existed at the time when lawmakers first enacted the
mandatory rule.23 For example, imagine that Beta, like Acme, had a
charter provision requiring an eighty percent shareholder vote to
approve of a merger when the legislature mandated a two-thirds vote.
When the legislature repeals its two-thirds rule, is Beta's eighty
percent rule revived?
This situation is closely analogous to the question of whether a
judicial decision overruling a previous decision holding a statute
unconstitutional revives the statute. Almost without exception,
courts have held that the repealing decision does indeed restore the
statute.24 The logic behind these decisions is highly formal-while
courts can bar application of a statute, they cannot erase the pages of
the statute books.25 In the words of one court, statutes are
"dormant[,] but not dead" when declared unconstitutionai.26
Whether the formal justification for reviving statutes once held
unconstitutional applies to company charters is unclear. Legislatures
usually retain the power to amend business charters27 and thus may
have the power to render privately-drafted provisions not just

23. The possibility of revival also touches on the possibility that company charter
provisions, like laws, perhaps should not be enforced after long periods of desuetude.
24. See William Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the
Revival of "Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1902, 1908-15 (1993)
(collecting cases).
25. See id. at 1913-14 ("Almost all ... courts that have addressed the issue of whether
a statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived have ... us[ed] ...
formalistic analysis.").
26. Jawish v. Morlet, 86 A.2d. 96, 97 (D.C. 1952) (emphasis added). Treanor and
Sperling criticize this formal approach because it ignores how rational parties will behave
in light of the initial decision striking down a statute as unconstitutional. As long as
reversals are rare, opponents of such statutes have little reason to devote valuable time,
effort, and political capital to the seemingly redundant task of obtaining a legislative
repeal of the voided statute. Treanor & Sperling, supra note 24, at 1917-41. Treanor and
Sperling would apply a version of prospective overruling and would not resuscitate the
statute unless the legislature re-enacted it after the court reversed itself. !d. at 1907.
27. See infra Part II.A.2.
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dormant, but dead. Moreover, the formal rule may fly in the face of
the likely intent of most parties. Given the cost of company elections,
shareholders may not bother repealing a provision voided by
statutory mandate, just as political voters may not pursue legislative
solutions where they have obtained a judicial victory. 28
If owners anticipate such a legislative termination of a
mandatory ru1e, they may plan ahead by enacting an anticipatory
charter provision declaring their desire to deviate from the
mandatory rule if and when repealed. When companies employ this
declaratory device in combination with general freezes, however,
there may be difficult issues of construction. For example, assume
that Beta has no specific charter provision on the vote required to
effectuate a merger and the legislature mandates a two-thirds vote. If
Beta enacts a freeze followed by a declaration that it wishes to
require an eighty percent vote for mergers, its intent is clear:

Legislature
mandates
2/3ds rule

Corporation
enacts freeze

Corporation
expresses
desire for 80%
rule

Legislature
eliminates
mandatory
2/3ds rule

The later specific measure in favor of an eighty percent rule
trumps the earlier freeze that facially endorsed the existing two-thirds
rule. If, however, the corporation enacts the freeze after expressing
its desire for an eighty percent rule, its intent is less clear:

Legislature
mandates
2/3ds rule

Corporation
expresses
desire for 80%
rule

Corporation
enacts freeze

Legislature
eliminates
mandatory
2/3ds rule

The later-enacted freeze, facially, embraces the existing
mandatory ru1e that is inconsistent with the specific charter provision
to the contrary, even though the firm enacted the specific provision
after the legislature adopted the mandatory rule. The counterargument is that the corporation never repealed the specific charter
provision and likely simply overlooked the effect of a general freeze
on this specific issue.
28. Treanor & Sperling, supra note 24, at 1918-24.
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The determinative factor in these complex transition scenarios is
the company owner's intent. This is the touchstone of transition
analysis in company law. The issues presented in the remainder of
the paper, for the most part, are quite different than those just
examined because they involve enabling (as opposed to mandatory)
rules. Yet, the intent of company owners retains center stage.
II. POSITIVE LAW: ARE FREEZES LEGAL?

Although specific charter provisions in effect freeze out changes
in statutory default rules,29 the legality of a general freeze is less
certain. Neither legislatures, courts, nor academic commentators
have addressed this Article's novel freeze mechanism.
The
mandatory language of transition provisions in state company codes
and statutory provisions reserving the power to amend company
charters provide grounds to argue that the general freeze is invalid.
These terms seem to mandate that, where company charters are
silent, the new rule shall apply. Arguably, a freeze frustrates this
practice and hence should be illegal.
After fleshing out this case against the legality of the freeze, the
remainder of this Part provides two grounds to reject this
interpretation of company law transition and reserved power
provisions. First and foremost, the enabling nature of company law
provides strong grounds to reject a constrictive reading of transition
rules. A limited version of the dormant (but not dead) vested rights
doctrine supports this argument. Second, the traditional presumption
that legislation applies only prospectively is invariably followed for
legal transitions involving enabling (as opposed to mandatory) legal
rules.
A. The Case Against the Legality of the Freeze
1. Mandatory Transition Provisions

The Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA) contains a
typical transition provision: "This Act applies to all domestic
corporations in existence on its effective date .... "3° Formally, then,
29. See discussion supra text accompanying note 17.
30. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 17.01 (1999). The Revised Uniform Partnership Act
(RUPA) and the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) are similar but delay
their application to existing entities, see REVISED UNIFORM P'SHIP Acr § 1006, 6.U.L.A.
122 (1995); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr. § 1205, 6A U.L.A. 429 (1995), presumably to
provide owners with time to enact specific charter provisions preserving old default rules.
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for those issues on which a corporation's charter is silent, the default
rules in the new act displace those in the original act. This transition
rule does not directly declare the invalidity of a general freeze clause,
but the official comments provide additional grounds for such a
determination. One MBCA comment provides: "It is undesirable to
'grandfather' existing corporations under earlier statutes since that
results in the permanent coexistence of two different and overlapping
This
systems of corporate law, with resulting confusion."31
commentary does not facially invalidate freeze clauses. Wide
adoption of freezes, however, would result in the potentially
"permanent existence" of two or more "different and overlapping
systems of corporate law." The MBCA comment considers the
"resulting confusion" grounds to move all corporations to the same
set of default rules,32 a result unachievable if any firm can adopt a
general freeze.
2. Reserved Power Provisions
In addition to mandatory transition provisions, every state
corporate code and virtually all other contemporary company statutes
contain a section reserving the legislature's power to amend the
statute.33 The MBCA contains a typically broad reserved power
clause: "The [name of state legislature] has power to amend or repeal
all or part of this Act at any time and all domestic and foreign
corporations subject to this Act are governed by the amendment or
repeal."34 States began using reserved power clauses in the wake of
31. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 17.01, official cmt. (1999). The same comment also
justifies retroactive application based on the separate rationale that the revised MBCA
"contains few major substantive changes." Id. The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.),
discussed infra Part III.B.2, relies on this factor in crafting its transition rules.
32. The extent of any confusion is questioned infra text accompanying notes 125-26.
33. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 {1991 & Supp. 1999). The RUPA,
promulgated in 1993, contains a reserved power clause modeled after those appearing in
corporation statutes: "A partnership governed by this [Act] is subject to any amendment
to or repeal of this (Act]." REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 1006, 6 U.L.A. 26 (1995).
The RUPA's precursor, the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) contained no
reserved power clause. Hence, entities formed under the UPA arguably can use the
Contract Clause to resist alteration of enabling and even mandatory rules in the statute.
Most LLC statutes contain reserved power clauses. E.g., DEL CODE. ANN. tit. 6,
§ 18-1106 (1993 & Supp. 1999). There are, however, some prominent exceptions: the
California and New York statutes, and the ULLCA do not reserve legislative power to
amend existing charters via statutory amendments.
34. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 1.02 (1999). Delaware's reserved power clause carves
out a small exception for liabilities incurred under the previous act, stating that
amendments or repeals "shall not take away or impair any remedy under this [statute)
against any corporation or its officers for any liability which shall have been previously
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the Supreme Court's application of the Constitution's Contract
Clause35 to strike down a state's attempt to modify unilaterally the
corporate charter of Dartmouth College.36 Reserving the power to
amend ex ante means that state legislatures have effectively destroyed
the basis for any Contract Clause objections to changes in their
company statutes. Reserved power clauses are not limited to
mandatory provisions; as written, they appear to apply to enabling
rules as well. Thus, their direct and mandatory language seems to
trump attempts by companies to block statutory changes from
affecting their charter by implementing charter freezes.
Not all commentators agree that reserved power clauses give
state legislatures unlimited power to amend existing company
charters. Nelson Ferebee Taylor, for example, argues that reserved
power clauses authorize amendments only to those charter provisions
touching on relations between the state and the company. Attempts
to alter purely private bargains struck in the charter, Taylor
maintains, violate either the remnants of the vested rights doctrine or
the Constitution's prohibition on the impairment of contracts.37 If
Taylor is correct, then reserved power clauses provide no basis for
rejecting the legality of a charter freeze. Indeed, under his reading of
the Contract Clause, the freeze is not merely legal, it is
constitutionally mandated.38

incurred." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (1993 & Supp. 1999).
35. "No state shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... "
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
36. Trs. of Dartmouth Coli. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,650 (1819). Justice
Story's dissent suggested that states wishing to amend corporate charters should reserve
such rights by statute. ld. at 708 (Story, J., dissenting). For a more detailed discussion of
the application of the Contract Oause to corporate statutes, see Henry N. Butler & Larry
E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767 passim
(1989) [hereinafter Butler & Ribstein, Contract Clause and the Corporation]; Henry N.
Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract Clause, 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 611, 631-34 (1988).
37. Nelson Ferebee Taylor, Evolution of the Corporate Combination Law: Policy
Issues and Constitutional Questions, 76 N.C. L. REv. 687, 996-1010 (1998).
38. For a similar view, see Butler & Ribstein, Contract Clause and the Corporation,
supra note 36, at 782-93.
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B. The Case Supporting the Legality of the Freeze
1. The Enabling Nature of Corporate Law
Modern company law is, for the most part, enabling rather than
mandatory.39 Roberta Romano offers the following definition of, and
justification for, enabling corporate statutes.
Modern corporation codes tend to be enabling rather than
mandatory statutes: they are standard form contracts
specifying the rights and obligations of managers and
shareholders, which can often be altered by private
agreement to suit the circumstances of particular firms. The
enabling approach is a function of the contractual nature of
the corporation. Participation in a firm is voluntary;
common stock is one of a vast array of available investment
vehicles.40
The same principles apply to partnerships and other types of firms.
This is not merely an academic gloss; the enabling principle
appears in virtually all company codes. Delaware's corporations
statute, in a provision over thirty years old, states that a firm's articles
of incorporation (charter) may contain "any provision for the
management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the
corporation."41 The California and New York corporate statutes
contain similar provisions.42 More recently drafted corporate statutes
contain even clearer declarations of the enabling nature of corporate
law. In addition to a provision similar to those just cited,43 Michigan's
corporate statute, as substantially amended in 1989, declares:

39. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
40. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 85 (1993).
Other business entity statutes are similarly enabling, rather than mandatory, sets of rules.
See Ribstein, Statutory Forms, supra note 21, at 22 ("Business association statutes are
standard form contracts that the parties can either accept or reject.").
41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (1993 & Supp. 1999).
42. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(d) (West 1990 & Supp. 2000) (stating that articles of
incorporation may contain "[a]ny other provision, not in conflict with Jaw, for the
management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporations."); id.
§ 212(b} (containing a virtually identical provision for bylaw provisions); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW§ 402(b) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 2000) ("The certificate of incorporation may set
forth any provision, not inconsistent with this chapter or any other statute of this state,
relating to the business of the corporation, its affairs, its rights or powers or the rights or
powers of its shareholders, directors, or officers.").
43. See MICH COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 450.1209 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000) ("The articles
of incorporation may contain any provision not inconsistent with this act or another
statute of this state ....").
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This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying purposes and policies which include all of the
following:
(b) To provide a general corporate form for the conduct or
promotion of a lawful business or purpose with variations
and modifications from the form as interested parties in any
corporation may agree upon, subject only to overriding
interests of this state and of third parties.44
Partnership and limited liability statutes contain similar
statements of their enabling, as opposed to mandatory, nature. 45 The
essence of these enabling statutes is that owners of companies may
arrange their internal affairs any way they desire; anything not
positively barred is permitted. Because no company statute bars
general freezes, the enabling nature of these laws provides strong
grounds for their legality. The seemingly mandatory transition rules
discussed in Part ll.A should apply only where a firm has adopted
neither a specific provision at odds with the statutory default nor a
general freeze rejecting all statutory innovation.
Similarly, company law can harmonize reserved power clauses
with its pervasively enabling nature. There is no doubt that the
legislature can enact all sorts of mandatory rules that apply to existing
companies (e.g., taxes and fees, filing requirements, and tort liability).
These are peripheral matters; company law in the main involves rules

44. Id. § 450.1103{b).
45. "[R]elations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership are
governed by the partnership agreement." REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 103{a), 6 U.L.A.
16 {1995). Section 103{b) of the RUPA, contains a short list of immutable rules governing
relations among partners. ld. § 103{b), 6 U.L.A. 16 {1995). Even these relatively modest
deviations from the enabling ideal have been the subject of substantial controversy, and
some have attributed the relatively slow adoption of the RUPA to these restraints on
partners' freedom of contract. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership
Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus. LAW. 45 passim (1993) [hereinafter Ribstein,
Revised Uniform Partnership Act].
The ULLCA contains a similar provision allowing complete freedom for owners
in drafting an LLC's charter ("operating agreement") save for a short list of immutable
terms. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. Acr § 103, 6A U.L.A. 434-35 {1995). The official
comments state that, save for the exceptions, "[e]very section of this Act is simply a
default rule, regardless of whether the language of the section appears to be otherwise
mandatory. This approach eliminates the necessity of repeating the phrase 'unless
otherwise agreed' in each section." I d. at 435. The Delaware Limited Liability Company
Act explicitly states that "[i]t is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company
agreements." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101{b) {1993 & Supp. 1999).
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and procedures for intra-firm govemance.46 When an amendment
changes one of the numerous statutory default rules, and a charter
has neither a specific provision on point nor a freeze, the firm is at the
mercy of the legislature. Given a reserved power clause, the firm
cannot object that the legislature rewrote its charter.
When the firm has a specific charter provision that differs from
the new statutory default, there is no question that the specific rule
remains valid despite the legislature's reserved power to amend. A
general freeze provision has a similar but wider effect. It does not
frustrate the legislature's undoubted power to adopt new mandatory
rules, and it does not frustrate the legislature's desire to adopt new
default rules for those firms without provisions overriding statutory
defaults. The freeze simply operates on a broader scale than specific
charter provisions-it announces that the firm wishes to exert
maximal control over transitions involving enabling (voluntary) rules.
Although reserved power clauses are read quite broadly today,
they were once subject to significant limitations.47 The "vested rights"
doctrine48 conceptually separated a company into two contracts. For
relations between the state and the company, the reserved power
clause preserved the state's power to amend unilaterally the
company's charter.49 For relations between the owners and managers
of the firm, however, the vested rights doctrine carved out an arena of
contractual freedom immune to legislative innovation:
[T]his reserved power of the State to alter or amend charters
of incorporation, although wide, is not unlimited, and that it
can properly be exercised only to amend a charter so far as it
represents a contract between the corporation and the State,
and not in respects as to which it constitutes a contract
between the corporation and the shareholders or between
the shareholders themselves. That is the view presently
taken of the extent of the reserved power by many, if not
most, of the courts which have considered the question.5°
Although the vested rights doctrine has fallen into disfavor as an
illegitimate constraint on the power of the legislature to amend
company laws,51 it contains a core insight that remains valid: for rules
that have no effect outside of a company, the enabling nature of
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See supra note 4.
See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 12, at 951-79.
See id. at 953-54.
See id.
Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 87 A.2d 227, 232 (Pa. 1952) (footnote omitted).
See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 10.01(a) (1999); id. § 10.01 official cmt.
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corporate law provides compelling grounds to permit firms to manage
their own transitions to new statutory defaults.
Further, a prohibition against freezes imposes unnecessary costs
on firms that wish to use the device. A general freeze merely
accomplishes in one fell swoop what firms may accomplish by a series
of specific charter provisions, an expensive endeavor. A rule
invalidating general freezes, then, would do no more than force firms
wishing to freeze their charters to restate explicitly all statutory
default rules in their charter-defeating in large part the economizing
rationale for company law in the first place.52
The state, in its role as promulgator of company laws, is
analogous to private firms that prepare forms for various legal
transactions (e.g., land sales contracts, mortgages, leases, and secured
credit agreements). In some contexts, private parties using forms
prepared by third parties may wish to emulate the company law
model and incorporate all innovations into their ongoing relationship.
For example, bond indenture agreements invariably declare explicitly
that the parties will use Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) rules as they evolve, not as they existed at the time of
issuance.53
In general, however, private parties using forms have no
intention to incorporate future changes made by the third-party
producer of the form. Mortgages, leases, and other contractual
arrangements, without any mention of the matter, are universally
assumed to be governed by the language within the four corners of
each document, unaffected by later alterations by the form's
promulgator.
There are two lessons to draw from these examples. First, it goes
without saying that contractual parties using a third-party form have
complete freedom to follow or reject future alterations to the form
and to make this decision ex ante. Second, and more importantly, if
the parties wish to incorporate future changes, they must explicitly so
indicate in the contract. The default rule is that future changes do not
affect executed deals using a particular form. Thus, for almost all
form consumers, the freeze is not only legal, it is the default rule. To
the extent company law is no more than a form contract, this default
supports the permissibility of the freeze. 54
52. See supra notes 39-45.
53. See Richard Leftwich, Accounting Information in Private Markets: Evidence from
Private Lending Agreements, 58 Accr. REv. 23, 36 (1983).
54. Whether the freeze should be and can be the default transition rule for company
law is discussed infra Part III.F.
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2. The Presumption of Legislative Prospectivity & Enabling Rules
If other enabling areas of law permitted the freeze or similar
privately-adopted advance specification of transition rules, it would
be easier to make the case for freezing company charters. The device,
however, appears to be entirely novel. This Section, using the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) as an example, demonstrates
that combining the fact that (a) statutes presumptively operate only
prospectively, with (b) the very nature of enabling rules (like the
U.C.C. or company statutes), implies that the freeze is legal.
The basic idea is simple: prospective legislation that parties may
opt into is functionally equivalent to a freeze. Prospectivity ensures
that legislative action does not rewrite existing agreements; the ability
to opt in means that contractual parties may, by consent, select the
new rule.55 This is the very state of affairs produced by freeze clauses
in corporate charters. While company law is largely statutory, judicial
decisions also play an important role. The last portion of this Part
considers the efficacy of attempting to freeze out judicially-generated
changes in the law.
·
A well established principle is " 'that statutes operate only
prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively.' "56 In
at least one prominent mandatory statutory regime, this presumption
may be honored more in the breach: revisions to the tax code often
operate retroactively by their language, and virtually always in their
effect.57
In enabling areas of the law, however, "[t]he principle that
statutes operate only prospectively" does indeed govern transitions.
The U.C.C., perhaps the most widely used body of enabling rules, has
included transition rules excluding virtually all retroactive effects
when it introduces major changes in the law. The first version of the
55. It is true that parties to a company contract may, per their charter, opt into new
statutory rules with only a majority or supermajority vote, which is short of the unanimity
required to rewrite standard contracts. Parties forming a company or buying an interest,
however, are at least on constructive notice that a majority or perhaps a supermajority has
the power to amend the charter.
56. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1994) (quoting United
States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982)). It is unclear whether there are
constitutional limits on the extent of legislative retroactivity. In United States v. Carlton,
512 U.S. 26 (1994), the Court permitted retroactive elimination of a tax deduction, noting
that Congress has a long history of adopting tax rules with relatively short retroactive
periods. ld. at 35. Justice O'Connor, concurring, warned that government interests in
retroactivity at some point become outweighed by taxpayers' interest in "finality and
repose." Id. at 37-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, concurring, described the
outcome of the case as "harsh and oppressive." !d. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. See, e.g., Carlton, 511 U.S. at 30-33.
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U.C.C., promulgated in 1962, unambiguously declared that its
extensive legal innovations "[a]pplied to transactions entered into and
events occurring after [enactment]."58 It specifically stated that acts
displaced by the U.C.C. (such as the Uniform Sales Act59 and the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act60) would ·continue to govern
transactions predating the U.C.C.61 The key moment was the time of
contract formation, not performance: "The conclusion that the Code
does not apply to transactions occurring before its effective date is
not altered by the circumstances that a further fact or transaction
relating to the pre-Code transaction takes place after the effective
date of the Code." 62 Given this uniform prospectivity, there would
have been no reason to look askance at a private freeze clause in a
contract governed by the statutes displaced by the U.C.C. Such a
privately-chosen provision would have been consistent with (indeed,
functionally redundant with) the transition rules included in the
publicly-enacted U.C.C.
The transition rules for the 1972 amendments to the U.C.C. seem
to fly in the face of the original 1962 prospective approach: with a
few exceptions, the 1972 amendments applied retroactively.63 The
drafters, however, did not believe that the amendments contained
many truly new rules of law; "[u]nless a change in law has clearly
been made, the provision of [the amended U.C.C.] shall be deemed
declaratory of the meaning of the [original U.C.C.]." 64 By describing
the amendments as "declaratory," the drafters in effect analogized
58. U.C.C. § 10-101 (1962) (amended 2000).
59. UNIF. SALES Acr (1906) (amended 1922).
60. UNIF. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS Acr (1896).
61. U.C.C. § 10-102 (2000). Thirty years after promulgation of the U.C.C., these
otherwise repealed acts continue to govern continuing transactions predating enactment of
the U.C.C. See County of Macon v. Edgcomb, 654 N.E.2d 598, 600 (III. Ct. App. 1995);
Braden Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 661 N.E.2d 838, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Organ v.
Value Bus. Ctr., Inc., 609 So. 2d 998, 1001--02 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
62. 9A RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 10-101:5, at 763 (3d ed., rev. vol. 1994}.
63. The 1972 transition rules are somewhat opaque: "The [1962 Code transition rules]
shall continue to apply to the [Code as amended in 1972] and for this purpose the [old and
new Codes] shall be considered one continuous statute." U.C.C. § 11-102 (1972)
(amended 2000}. The drafters included this provision for those states that had not
adopted, or had only recently adopted, the U.C.C. 9A ANDERSON, supra note 62, § 11102:1, at 791 (quoting Editorial Board Comment). They did not want states adopting the
major changes embodied in the transition to the original 1962 U.C.C. to apply its rules
retroactively. Section 11-102 contemplates that the 1972 amendments apply retroactively,
but makes an exception for transactions predating enactment of the 1962 Code. !d.
Some of the more substantive 1972 amendments did not apply retroactively, or
applied only after a transition period. U.C.C. §§ 11-104 to -107 (1972} (amended 2000).
64. ld. § 11-108.
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most of the amendments to judicial clarification of statutory
meaning.65 Thus, the retroactive nature of the 1972 amendments led
to little substantive change.
Statutes like the U.C.C. have no monopoly on change-case law
evolves too. Judicial decisions, of course, usually claim to declare
what the law has always been and thus presumably apply
retroactively. It is difficult to imagine how a company could freeze
out such run-of-the-mill case law. Suits pitting owners against other
owners or managers over the meaning of an explicit charter term or a
default statutory rule require courts to decide the "correct" or "true"
pre-existing meaning of the disputed term. Such rulings do not create
new rules in any meaningful sense and the motivation for the freezebarring ex ante future charter amendments affected by third party
lawmakers-does not apply. Furthermore, the courts' interpretive
rather than rulemaking role makes the general freeze undesirable:
Even shareholders in corporations formed subsequent to the
statute's passage or its first judicial construction were on
notice that the term's meaning could evolve over time,
because the legislature had delegated to the courts the task
of solving the problem. Problem solving is a dynamic
process, and hence one should not expect the law to remain
static.66
Similarly, decisions involving other firms that construe statutory
defaults (or similar charter language) declare existing law, and do not
create new law. Hence, they also seem beyond the reach of a charter
freeze.
Courts do on occasion make new law,67 and the motivation for
the freeze applies just as much for these judicial innovations as for
legislative innovations in company law. Specific charter provisions, as
in the statutory case, would of course trump judicial innovation in
non-mandatory rules. To guard against all possible changes, however,
drafters could include freeze provisions to prevent all such court
65. Despite the drafters' justification for retroactive application of the 1972
amendments as merely declaratory of the meaning of the U.C.C., many courts have
refused to apply even modest alterations retroactively. E.g., Am. State Bank v. White, 535
P.2d 424, 431-32 (Kan. 1975); Third Nat'l Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 446 N.E.2d 380,
382 {Mass. 1983). Thus, it seems likely that courts would have upheld freeze provisions
locking out the effect of the 1972 amendments despite the drafters' concerted attempt
merely to "declare" existing law as opposed to making new law.
66. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An
Essay on Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618, 1689 (1989).
67. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983) (replacing
dated "block" method of valuing corporations with "any techniques or methods which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community").
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decisions from amending their charters. Some cases are easy, such as
when courts explicitly reverse precedents or openly declare that they
are crafting a rule from whole cloth. But between such obvious cases
of lawmaking and the opinions discussed in the previous paragraph
that merely interpret existing law, there will be many gray cases.
Reasonable minds will often differ on whether or not a court has
generated new law to which a freeze clause would apply. 68 The freeze
provision itself could specify that some trusted third party, such as a
respected corporate lawyer, would decide whether or not a new
decision was pregnant in pre-existing law or really struck out in a new
direction. This party would not be obligated to defer to the court's
view in deciding whether or not the freeze should bar the application
of a judicial opinion to the company's charter. The enabling nature of
company law, combined with a properly limited reading of transition
and reserved power clauses, indicates that company charter freezes
are likely legal as a matter of positive law.

III.

NORMATIVE ANALYSIS: THE INTERACTION OF TRANSITION
POLICY & ENABLING RULES

This Part considers the public policy arguments for and against
freeze provisions. It begins with three observations on the proper
methods for assessing the desirability of freeze provisions. First, it
demonstrates that conventional normative analyses of transition
rules, designed with mandatory legal regimes in mind, are
inappropriate for weighing the wisdom of enabling regime transition
rules.69 Second, it shows that justifications for mandatory company
law rules (which might support a mandatory rule against charter
freezes) are irrelevant to the desirability of freeze provisions.7° Third,
a major justification for mandatory rules is to deter acts adversely
affecting third parties-so-called negative external effects. This

68. Consider, for example, the "discovery" of the frustration of purpose doctrine in
contract law. For instance, Krell v. Henry, 2 KB. 740, 745-49 (Eng. C.A. 1903), along with
similar "Coronation Cases" involving contractual disputes in the aftermath of England's
King Edward VII canceled coronation celebrations, is widely cited for creating the
frustration of purpose doctrine. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 930 (3d ed. 1986) ("The term 'frustration' seems to have come
into general use, both in England and in this country, following Krell v. Henry and the
other so-called Coronation cases ...."). Yet Krell neither explicitly nor implicitly admits
to creating new rules to govern contracts. Rather, the court sounds as if clauses permitting
recission for frustration of purpose have long been implicit in all contracts and cites an
earlier case, Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B.1863), to support its holding.
69. See infra Part III.A.
70. See infra Part III.B.
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Article shows that permitting charter freezes does not undermine any
positive external effects that arise when many firms use the same
governance rules.71
The implications of the freeze differ significantly for public
companies versus privately-held firms. For public corporations and
other firms with widely-dispersed ownership (e.g., some limited
partnerships), the desirability of the freeze depends on whether state
competition leads to efficient (race to the top) or inefficient (race to
the bottom) statutes. If states are racing to the top, freeze provisions
stand in the way of efficient corporate charters; conversely, if states
are racing to the bottom, freezes protect shareholders from
management depredation.72 Charters for smaller businesses are much
more analogous to contracts, and there is no compelling reason to bar
parties to such contracts from agreeing to freeze out potentially
undesirable legislative amendments to company laws.73 Finally, this
Article shows that, paradoxically, when the freeze makes the most
sense as the default transition rule, it is least likely to become the
law.74

A. Transition Policy
Approaches

&

the Inapplicability

of Conventional

The fundamental black letter rule of legal transitions, "[t]he
principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial
decisions operate retrospectively,"75 is not without policy justification.
Because courts must wait for disputes to reach them before declaring
legal principles, they cannot choose their own agenda and thus are
less able than legislators to make significant and unexpected changes
in the law. In addition, "judges articulate and tend to adhere to
established principles."76
The principle behind the differing presumptions about legislative
and judicial transition rules seems to be that it is unfair to apply large
and surprising new legal rules retroactively-something supposedly
done by legislation, and only by legislation. "Fairness arguments
about retroactivity are based on principles of equity and justice.
Commentators have suggested that fair retroactivity rules should
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
1998).

See infra Part III. C.
See infra Part III.D.
See infra Part III.E.
See infra Part III.F.
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1994).
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.2, at 571 (5th ed.
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provide notice of applicable legal standards and protect reliance
interests . . . . Fairness concerns are typically raised in support of
prospective application of new legal rules."77
Even those who agree that fairness should determine transition
policy have attacked the classical institutional approach to transition
policy-legislative prospectivity and judicial retroactivity. Jill Fisch
points out that some legislative innovations are modest and entirely
expected78 and that some judicial innovations are significant and
unexpected.79 Thus, she rejects the classical approach. In its place,
she proposes an "evolutionary theory" for transition policy:
evolutionary legal change (small, incremental transitions) should
apply retroactively, while revolutionary change should not.80 Those
making transition policy, then, must examine legal changes on a caseby-case basis. Notice and reliance will depend on many contextual
facts. How clear was the existing rule? Was change predictable? Is
the change really novel, or just a slight tweak? 81 This more nuanced
approach, Fisch argues, would "provide notice of applicable legal
standards and protect reliance interests ..."-in other words, it would
be fair. 82
In an enabling system, the concerns of fairness (notice of legal
change and reliance on existing law) are non sequiturs. Indeed, the
freeze helps firms avoid surprises that may undermine reliance
interests. The freeze, then, is an important tool in letting the
legislature amend enabling rules as it pleases, leaving it to individual
firms to opt out in advance (freeze) or ex post, or to accept new rules.
Fisch's distinction between evolutionary and revolutionary change is
similarly irrelevant for company law. If virtually every party in every
firm wants a revolutionary change, the legislature undermines no
expectations or reliance interests by "meeting demand" and changing
the law to suit companies' desires. And again, the freeze enables the
remaining firms to avoid surprises and maintain reliance interests.
77. Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1084-85 (1997).
78. !d. at 1109-10. For example, the minor 1972 amendments to the U.C.C., discussed
supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text, in large part merely clarified the finer points of
existing rules.
79. Fisch, supra note 77, at 1107-08; see also, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
500 (1954) (reversing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896), and deeming statesponsored segregation an Equal Protection violation); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938) (reversing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet) 1, 22 (1842), and holding
that federal courts must apply state common law in diversity cases).
80. Fisch, supra note 77, at 1105-11.
81. ld.
82. Id. at 1084.
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Unsurprisingly, those who believe that efficiency considerations,
rather than fairness, should dictate transition policy, disagree with the
classical justification for the legislative prospectivity and judicial
retroactivity, as well as Fisch's equilibrium approach for fair
transition policy.83 Louis Kaplow has made perhaps the most
powerful statement of the efficiency reasons to apply laws
retroactively, regardless of whether they are legislative or judicial,
evolutionary or revolutionary.84 He argues that sound government
policy is ultimately driven by exogenous factors such as technological
change and citizens' preferences. These independent variables may
change incrementally or radically and are largely unpredictable.
Kaplow's key observation is that consumers should treat legal
uncertainty no differently than they treat other types of uncertainty:
they should make plans with full knowledge that changing conditions
may lead the government to change course (i.e., change some laws).
Any transitional relief offered by the government merely reduces
individuals' incentives to deal with legal risk using the same tools they
use to deal with other risk (e.g., insurance or diversification). Forcing
people to bear the risk of their own acts is more efficient than
subsidizing them with transition relief.85
Kyle Logue raises one important caveat to Kaplow's efficiency
analysis.86 To the extent the government uses laws as incentives to
induce behavior, it must not retroactively change the rules in the
middle of the game. Rather, lawmakers must avoid retroactivity by
grandfathering pre-existing actors under the old rule. If the state fails
to provide transition relief in those areas where it uses "incentive
subsidies," it will develop a reputation for breaking promises. Once it
has such a reputation, the state will have to offer higher subsidies to
induce desired actions. If people know the government changes rules
mid-stream nine times out of ten, they will demand incentives ten
times as great as they would demand if the government always kept
its word and provided transition relief.87 Logue emphasizes, however,
that Kaplow's no-transition-relief rule holds outside of those areas in

83. Fisch herself notes: "efficiency is generally viewed as favoring retroactivity." /d.
at 1088.
84. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509, 511-15 (1986).
85. !d. at 527-32.
86. See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits
of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1129, 1129-32 (1996).
87. See id. at 1132 (describing "inefficient increase in the default premium that the
government must pay taxpayers to compensate them for the risk of tax transitions").
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which the government uses the law to create incentives for private
actors. 88
Neither the efficiency case for retroactivity nor Logue's
exception to it provide any grounds to suggest that the charter freeze
is undesirable. The gist of the efficiency argument for retroactivity is
that the law should provide private actors no relief from the risk of
legal change just as the law generally provides no relief for most other
risks. Society achieves optimal results when people rationally plan
for new laws.
This argument, however, applies only to mandatory laws; it has
no application to enabling laws. When the government changes tax
laws, environmental laws, and other mandatory rules, a regime of
retroactive application forces private actors to anticipate potential
legal change and thus tailor their economic decisions to changing
social needs. This analysis, however, is irrelevant for enabling laws
such as company statutes. The purpose of these laws is not to bring
private acts into line with social needs; enabling laws merely aim to
save costs in private transactions without any affect on third parties.
Society is not harmed when companies decline to adopt new default
intra-firm governance rules; if such choices had a negative impact on
anyone outside of the company, society would make the rule
mandatory instead of optional.
Moreover, the charter freeze actually serves efficiency in a
manner somewhat analogous to the efficiency argument for
retroactivity. The freeze is a tool that can help firms manage the risk
of legal change to enabling rules. To the extent the government
chooses rules unsuited for some firms, efficiency analysis positively
supports the use of charter freezes. Company law, like tax law,
constantly changes and the point of the efficiency story is that we
want to encourage actors, to the extent possible, to anticipate change
and plan for it. The freeze is a very forward-looking measure to deal
with the prospect of change; it is analogous to investing in securities
whose value will be unaffected by changes in the tax code (instead of
searching for loopholes that may disappear overnight). The freeze
enables firms to insulate themselves from the risk of untoward legal
change.
The enabling nature of company law also makes Logue's
"incentive exception" to efficiency analysis inapplicable to the charter
freeze. Company law does not attempt to create incentives to alter

88. Seeid. at1154-58.
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behavior in specific ways; rather, business enterprise laws broadly aim
to facilitate whatever private actors wish to do.
Generalizing the arguments made in the previous paragraphs,
fairness, efficiency, and incentive rationales for transition rules simply
do not apply to laws. In mandatory areas of law in which transition
issues are usually litigated, it is generally not possible for rules to
leave everyone better off ex post. Although citizens will desire
efficient tax rules ex ante (before they know how the rule will impact
them), changes in mandatory rules usually create winners and losers.
Thus, it is impossible to adopt any new tax law if the losers have the
power to opt out. This is simply not true for enabling legal regimes.
If the legislature picks the rule desired by the majority, and the
minority can opt out, then we can have some winners while insuring
that there are no losers. The charter freeze is a cheap and powerful
tool for those who anticipate that they generally will not favor any
statutory innovation.

B. Inapplicability of Justifications for
Substantive Corporate Law

Mandatory

Rules

of

Beyond general theories of legal transitions, company law
scholarship has developed models to explain the exceptional
circumstances in which rules governing business entities should be
mandatory rather than enabling. This Part shows that none of the
justifications for mandatory company laws weighs in favor of a
mandatory rule against charter freezes.89 Indeed, some of the
rationales suggest that the freeze should be mandatory, or at least the
default transition rule.
When a company's acts potentially impact third parties, the
justification for mandatory rules is clear. Most rules regulating the
external relations of business entities come from outside of company
statutes. For example, firms are liable for common law torts and
statutory violations just like any other legal person. Company
statutes do, however, address a few external concerns. They contain

89. Black argues forcefully that mandatory corporate law rules are irrelevant. Black,
supra note 4, at 551-62. He argues that corporate law will usually adopt rules that most
parties desire; that advance planning, especially choice of state of incorporation, can
circumvent most mandatory rules; that unpopular rules are subject to great pressure for
change; and that remaining mandatory rules concern trivial matters. For a similar
argument, see ROMANO, supra note 40, at 90-91. If mandatory rules, as Black contends,
are truly irrelevant, then any mandatory rule against charter freezes would be irrelevant
(either firms did not desire the freeze, or some states permitted the mechanism). Thus, for
the sake of argument, this Part assumes that mandatory rules are not entirely irrelevant.
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provisions requiring firms to file addresses to facilitate service of
process.90 Capital requirements and dividend tests, albeit weak,
provide creditors with some protection against payments to owners
that render the firm unable to pay its debts. 91 These external affairs,
however, are peripheral concerns for company law. Company law
focuses primarily on internal firm governance: relations between
managers and owners, and among owners.92 The charter freeze,
governing transition rules affecting only owners, fits completely
within this intra-company model and hence falls outside the narrow
categories of company statutes containing mandatory rules.
Coffee has noted that modern contract law imposes a few
mandatory terms on the parties to all contracts, such as the U.C.C.'s
requirement of good faith and fair dealing, and argues that these
requirements should apply among the parties to company contracts
no less than in other consensual settings.93 It is difficult to argue,
however, that a charter freeze is a bad faith measure or that including
one is unfair dealing. Potential owners or managers who think the
freeze unwise or unfair can simply elect to invest or work elsewhere.
This point, however, overlooks the possibility of opportunism
among co-owners of a company. Original charters receive, in effect,
unanimous support, since those who do not like the charter simply
decline to invest. Charters can be amended by less than unanimous
votes, however, and this raises the possibility of a majority owner
opportunistically taking advantage of a minority. Parties may enter
company contracts with expectations, only to see them frustrated by
such mid-stream changes. Rational investors will foresee this
possibility and will be wary of buying shares in the first place. In
public corporations, dispersed and disorganized shareholders will
worry that managers, with their control of the proxy machinery ,94 will
90. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(2) (1996 & Supp. 1998); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW
§ 402(a)(8) (McKinney 1986 & Supp.1999); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT§ 2.02(a)(3) (1999).
91. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 170, 172, 174 (distributions to shareholders and
director liability for unlawful shareholder distributions); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:26,
12:92 (West 1994 & Supp.1999) (capital requirements); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 1701.12
(West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (capital requirements); TEX. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. pt.
3 art. 3.02 (West 1996) (capital requirements); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 6.40, 8.30
(1999) (capital requirements). Other theories for recovery, such as fraudulent conveyance
law, provide creditors with more effective remedies. CLARK, supra note 5, at 610.
92. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
93. John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 937 (1988) (citing
U.C.C. § 2-719); see also Coffee, supra note 66, at 1653-54 (noting the rarity of mandatory
intra-owner rules).
94. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 5, at 522.
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continually amend the charter in order to enrich themselves. In small
enterprises, minority owners may worry that the majority will amend
the charter to take a disproportionate share of earnings.
Managers or majority owners raising capital can charge more for
a given share of ownership if they can somehow assure potential
investors that the managers or owners will not opportunistically
amend the charter down the road, after investors have committed
their funds. 95 In the jargon of agency cost economics, managers need
a "bonding" device to assure investors that they will not be doublecrossed later.96 If insiders cannot signal their fidelity, there is a
"market for lemons" problem97 and trustworthy managers and owners
will be unable to realize a premium for their sincere intent to avoid
opportunistically altering the charter.98 Somewhat analogous to
Odysseus tying himself to his ship's mast to enable him to resist the
seductive song of the Sirens,99 insiders may wish to contract away
their right to alter course in the future.
One extreme solution, going far beyond a freeze, would be to
make charters unamendable except by unanimous consent_HJO This
option, however, gives every owner (no matter how small her stake)
veto power, and may create holdout problems. In addition,
unanimity in effect means the firm will be unable to adapt to change.
High supermajority requirements present the same problems.101
Jeffrey Gordon argues that less drastic state-crafted mandatory
rules provide the most effective way for managers and majority
owners to make credible promises to dispense with opportunistic midstream charter amendments. 102 The idea is that the legislature will
change mandatory rules if they become undesirable, and that this
95. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law,
89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395, 1399-1404 (1989); Coffee, supra note 93, at 941-50; Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1573--74
(1989) (describing "opportunistic amendment hypothesis").
96. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm· Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
97. See George A. Ackerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 488-92 (1970) (describing process where, if

higher-quality suppliers cannot credibly signal consumers of their quality (and thus
command a higher price), they may be driven out of the market by lower-quality, lowercost competitors despite demand for higher-quality goods at the higher price).
98. See Coffee, supra note 93, at 947-49.
99. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, bk. XII, 39-54 (Richmond Lattimore trans., Harper &
Row Publishers 1967).
100. Shareholders can always alter non-mandatory rules by unanimous vote, because
there is no party left to object to a unanimously-adopted charter amendment.
101. Gordon, supra note 95, at 1575.
102. !d.
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possibility of legislative response to changing circumstances is more
flexible and credible than requiring unanimous or high supermajority
votes to change a particular charter provision.103 Nevertheless, Coffee
argues for slightly more flexibility. Rather than limit firms to a single
mandatory rule against opportunistic amendment, Coffee thinks
company statutes should offer "a choice among quality-controlled
alternatives .... Opting out then needs to be quality constrained, but
neither forbidden nor blindly accepted."104
Whatever the proper tool for bonding against opportunistic midstream charter amendments, the charter freeze presents no such
threat of opportunism and, thus, this rationale for mandatory
company law rules does not suggest a mandatory rule against the
freeze. Indeed, as discussed in this Article, to the extent incumbent
management and majority owners exert influence over the lawmaking
process, the freeze itself may be an effective bonding device to assure
investors that those in control will not attempt to alter the charter
later via their friends in the legislature.105 Further, privately selected
transition rules seem sensible for mandatory rules designed to assist
contracting parties. Mandatory rules designed to help bond insiders
to their promises are part of the central purpose of company lawintra-firm governance. To the extent charter freezes are desirable for
enabling governance rules, they likewise are desirable for this special
species of mandatory company law provisions.

C. Concerns External to Companies
Mandatory rules designed to assist contracting parties are a
relatively small part of the universe of mandatory company law rules.
The main rationale for mandatory legal rules, whether for individuals
or business entities, is the potential for seemingly private acts to effect
third parties (negative external effects). Most laws designed to
encourage actors to weigh the possibility of adverse impact on others,
such as the common law of torts or the environmental statutes, apply
to firms no less than flesh and blood persons. Company laws do
include special rules designed to protect creditors. The first part of
103. Note that a rule that requires a supermajority vote is effectively somewhere
between a purely enabling and a mandatory rule. To see this, consider the extreme case of
a rule requiring unanimous shareholder consent to opt out. In a public corporation, with
numerous shareholders, attaining every last vote is virtually impossible and thus the rule is
effectively immutable. Generally, the higher the supermajority vote required to opt out of
a statutory default, the more closely the rule approaches immutability.
104. Coffee, supra note 93, at 972-74.
105. See infra Part III.D, III.E.
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this Section shows that the freeze, far from threatening creditor
interests, extends further protection (again) as a device for bonding
the firm to take some measures and forego others.
The second part of this Section deals with the much less common
phenomenon of positive external effects. Common use of a set of
legal rules, no less than common use of a given keyboard layout or
computer operating system, may generate benefits based on common
use alone-past, continuing, and future. Charter freezes facilitate
"defections" from the use of new statutory default provisions.
Intuition, and some scholarship,106 suggest that the possibility of such
defection can undermine the benefits of common use of company
laws. The Section concludes by rejecting this assertion and arguing
that charter freezes pose no threat to the positive external effects that
result from common use of statutory defaults.

1. Creditor Protection & the Freeze
When making loans, creditors must weigh, inter alia, the
possibility that the legislature will change creditor protection rules
and increase the likelihood of default. Legal change, no less than
recession or new competition, poses a risk to borrowers' financial
health. Seen in this light, charter freezes reduce one risk faced by
creditors: automatic change in the borrowers' charter imposed by the
legislature. Indeed, creditors might request a freeze as a limited form
of protection from the firm later lobbying the legislature to change
the contract between the creditor and the firm. Creditors could
supplement this protection by obtaining promises that borrowers will
not engage in certain activities permitted by existing or future
company law.
Creditors, at least of large public corporations, can and do
impose precisely such restrictions in omnipresent bond covenants.
The most common bond covenants, such as restrictions on share
issuance and repurchase, further debt, payment of dividends, changes
in board of directors, mergers, and the sale of substantially all assets,
effectively freeze some provisions of the borrower's charter.107 These
contractual promises trump any legislative change in default rules.
106. See infra text accompanying note 124.
107. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REv. 713, 741}-42
{1997) (summarizing event risk covenants governing share issuance and repurchase,
mergers, asset sales, changes in board of directors, and dividend policy); Clifford W. Smith
& Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting, 7 J. FIN. EcoN. 117, 123 (1979) (listing
most common types of bond covenants).
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Far from undermining creditor reliance, charter freezes extend
borrowing firms' credibility in bonding with creditors and forsaking
the opportunity to take later steps that increase the likelihood of
default.
2. Network Externalities
The very fact that many firms use common rules of governance
and that they, along with new firms, will continue to use them creates
benefits for all-so-called network externalities.108 "A product
exhibits network externalities when its value to a consumer depends
on the number of other consumers that use that product (or a
compatible one)."109 Computer operating systems are a canonical
example of network externalities. Knowledge of a given computer
environment is more valuable if many others use the same
environment. So too with company law. "[F]irms that use a
particular contract term form a 'network' analogous to the network of
PC users ... .'mo
Network externalities are one of two general categories of
positive external effects generated by common usages, denoting
"advantages ... available to a finn that adopts a contract term that is
or will become contemporaneously used by many firms for a
significant period of time." 111 This does not include "positive
externalities that earlier users of a contract term confer on later
users," which form a separate category called learning externalities.112
While network externalities run between all participants, learning
externalities implicitly involve subsidies conferred by earlier users on
later users. 113 Thus, to take a legal example, past precedents on a
particular statutory provision are learning externalities that benefit
new companies; the prospect of additional precedents in the future
are network externalities created by new as well as existing firms.
108. See Philip H. Dybvig & Chester S. Spatt, Adoption Externalities as Public Goods,
20 J. PUB. EcoN. 231, 231-33 (1983); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base &
Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncments, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
940, 940-43 (1986).
109. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. REV. 757, 763 (1995).
110. ld. at 775. "Other classic examples include videocassette recorders, typewriter
keyboards, telecommunications equipment, and thread sizes on nuts and bolts." Id. at 763
n.14.
111. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 107, at 725.
112. !d. at 724.
113. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior, and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 350
(1996).
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Common use of company governance provisions creates a host of
benefits. Bodies of court opinions construing particular terms serve
to "reduce uncertainty by providing substantive detail . . . or by
providing a procedural safe harbor." 114 Unambiguous terms in turn
help foster common business practices that reduce costs. Further,
clearly understood rules enhance competition for legal services by
making lawyers interchangeable, just as widespread use of Microsoft
Windows and applications running under it reduces the cost of hiring
workers with such skills.115 Finally, investors will feel more
comfortable with well-defined governance rules and hence will pay
more for securities issued by firms using provisions clarified through
long lines of precedent. 116
Numerous dispersed private actors do not always settle on
optimal standards. The process of choosing standards may go awry in
at least three ways. 117 First, private actors may settle on a standard
that is least costly at the outset, but that yields network externalities
so much below alternatives that, even discounting to present value, it
is inefficient in the long run. Second, private actors may choose
standards leading to excess uniformity. Third, dispersed actors may
settle on the opposite: excessively divergent standards. These latter
two possibilities require further discussion, as they have important
implications for the desirability of the freeze.
To understand how excessive uniformity can occur, imagine
that there are two distinct types of participants (T1 and T2) who
would choose different standards ex ante (S1 and S2) based on their
distinct preferences. If most of the early participants are type T1, S1
will predominate. Although T2 entrants inherently prefer S2, widelyused S1 offers more than offsetting learning and network benefits. If
each T2 latecomer could be sure that current and future T2 entrants
would choose S2, then each would choose S2. It is often prohibitively
expensive for dispersed participants to coordinate their behavior,
however, and each isolated T2 latecomer will likely choose the
established S1 over the risky S2.

114. Klausner, supra note 109, at 777.
115. See id. at 782 n.82.
116. See id. at 780. There is evidence that underwriters tell firms to use standard terms
and that unusual terms may scare off buyers. Henry T. Greely, Contracts as Commodities:
The Influence of Secondary Purchasers on the Form of Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REv. 133,
152-58 (1989).
117. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 107, at 734-36.
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This excess uniformity story may explain the failure of
specialized close corporation codes. 118 Although a number of states,
including Delaware, have enacted corporate law provisions tailored
specifically for privately-held firms, the overwhelming majority of
such firms have rejected these offerings and instead use general
corporate laws designed for public corporations. 119 This empirical
truth is hard to square with the observations that close corporations
are significantly different than public corporations120 and that
legislatures design general corporation statutes for public
corporations.121 Thus, there should be demand for specialized close
corporation rules of governance that provide a better fit for such
firms than statutes designed for quite different entities.
This lack of demand for close corporation rules partly results
from the fact that public corporations predate close corporations.122
Close corporations thus face the distorted choice faced by the T2
entrants. Although special close corporation statutes offer a set of
preferable rules, they are used by relatively few firms and hence offer
fewer learning externalities in the short run and create a significant
risk that they will offer fewer network externalities in the long run.
Close corporations, then, may select general corporate law rules
despite unanimous preference for tailor-made rules. Commentary on
reaction to Delaware's special close corporation provisions seem to
tell just such a tale.
[S]tatutory close corporations have not found particular
favor with practitioners. Practitioners have for the most part
viewed the complex statutory provisions underlying the
purportedly simplified operational procedures for close
corporations as legal quicksand of uncertain depth and have
118. See Tara J. Wortman, Note, Unlocking Lock-in: Limited Liability Companies and
the Key to Underutilization of Close Corporation Statutes, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1362, 138691 {1995).
119. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS § 1.19 {3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1997). Interestingly, Delaware and other
states with special close corporation codes did not mandate that existing close
corporations migrate to the new code. This is inconsistent with the general rule that
changes in the company statute effectively are inserted to all existing firms of a given type.
It is consistent with the general rule that while minor statutory changes apply
retroactively, major legislative innovation generally does not. See supra Part III.A.
120. See supra Part liLA; see also CLARK, supra note 5, at 761 (describing application
of rules designed for public corporations to close corporations as "clumsy").
121. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporate Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L.
REv. 259,268 (1967) (declaring that historically, corporation statutes "were adopted with
the publicly held corporation almost exclusively in mind").
122. See Kelvin H. Dickinson, Partners in a Corporate Cloak: The Emergence and
Legitimacy of the Incorporated Partnership, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 559,561 (1984).
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adopted the view that the objectives sought by the
subchapter are achievable for their clients with considerably
less uncertainty by cloaking a conventionally created
corporation with the panoply of charter provisions, transfer
restrictions, by-laws, stockholders' agreements, buy-sell
arrangements, irrevocable proxies, voting trusts or other
contractual mechanisms which were and remain the
traditional method for accomplishing the goals sought by the
close corporation provisions. 123
This leads to "excess uniformity," in the sense that, if the close
corporations coordinate their behavior at reasonable cost, they would
all elect to use laws better suited to their needs.
Private, dispersed actors may settle on the opposite of excess
uniformity-excess diversity. If there is no coordinating mechanism,
then a thousand isolated actors may choose a thousand different
standards. Gordon defends mandatory corporate law rules in part
based on this insight, arguing that corporate law is a public good with
positive external effects that would be destroyed by excessive
customization of governance rules.124 Mandatory rules assure some
minimal common core of company law and hence may be desirable,
despite other drawbacks, as a means to prevent disintegration of the
standard company contract. This argument applies with even greater
force to the freeze, which will tend to create smaller groups of firms
sharing common governance rules.
Michael Klausner argues convincingly that, in the context of
company law, Gordon's fear is misplaced.
Whereas Gordon argues that an individual firm has an
incentive to customize at the expense of firms already using
the common term, [network externality analysis]
demonstrates that the opposite concern is actually greater.
A firm choosing between a term already in common use and
a customized term may be too strongly inclined to opt for the
network externalities immediately available from the
former ....
The presence of network externalities offers a slim basis
for the use of mandatory rules in corporate law. To the
extent that coordination is needed, a default term can be
used. 125

123. DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACfiCE
§ 43.01, at 43-1 {1996) (emphasis added).
124. See Gordon, supra note 95, at 1567.
125. Klausner, supra note 109, at 835-36.
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A slightly different way to make the same point is to note the
efficiency of the coexistence of corporations and partnerships, each
having long served business owners with different preferences. A
single-minded focus on network externalities would lead lawmakers
to eliminate all but one business entity in order to generate the largest
possible mass of precedents behind one set of rules.
The network benefits of complete homogeneity, however, are
likely outweighed by the value of some amount of choice in selecting
a business entity. Company law must "promote an optimal balance
of uniformity and diversity in corporate contract terms." 126 Thus,
legislatures should provide, and indeed long have provided, a menu of
business entity options, each designed for a set of actors with
relatively uniform preferences.
This set -of options serves
heterogeneity among enterprises in general terms; charter freezes
serve heterogeneity in more specific ways. Once a firm has selected a
type, it may wish to exercise greater than normal control over the
evolution of its charter. If the legislature does its job, by definition
only a minority of firms will feel the need to preemptively reject
alterations of default ru1es.

D. Public Corporations: Which Way Are We Racing?
The policy analyses of the last three Sections provide no grounds
to oppose charter freezes and relatively weak support for such
provisions. General transition policy simply did not apply to enabling
transitions. Justifications for mandatory rules of corporate law,
including external effects, weigh in favor of the freeze. Evaluating the
normative desirability of permitting charter freezes requires us to step
down from the perspective of high theory and examine the context of
company governance.
The key distinction is between widely-owned public entities and
privately-owned firms.
The desirability of permitting public
corporations to freeze their charters turns on whether competition
between states for lucrative public incorporation fees and corporate
tax revenues leads to ru1es favoring management or shareholders.
This is the famous "race" debate among corporate law scholars. Until
fairly recently, most scholars accepted Carey's landmark thesis that
competition for corporate charters led to a "race to the bottom":
states vying to win reincorporations by favoring management over
shareholders in their corporate statutes.127 The pejorative label
126. !d. at765;seeid. at831-32,837-38.
127. See William L. Carey, Federalism and Corporate Law:

Reflections Upon
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"bottom" is normatively appropriate: rules favoring management are
a license to steal from shareholders in myriad ways (e.g., self-dealing,
excessive compensation, and expropriating attractive business
opportunities). These modes of theft are just as inefficient as simple
property theft, discouraging enterprise and raising monitoring costs.
A growing chorus of scholars has challenged this thesis, arguing
that markets, especially capital markets, constrain opportunistic
reincorporation jurisdictions favoring management.
Investors
(especially large institutional investors) know which states have such
rules, and will pay less for the shares of firms incorporating in these
states which in turn raises firms' cost of capital and makes them less
competitive. Reincorporating in states that cater to their welfare, as
opposed to shareholder welfare, may damage managers' reputations
for trustworthiness. These market monitoring mechanisms, so the
argument goes, put pressure on managers to incorporate in states
with rules favoring shareholders. This in turn causes states to engage
in a "race to the top": a continual quest for efficient rules that cater
to investors. 128
The outcome of this debate is dispositive of the charter freeze's
desirability for public firms. If states are engaged in a race to the
bottom, then statutory innovations will usually harm shareholders. In
such a world, the charter freeze is a powerful tool for policing
management, because all changes to the charter must garner at least a
majority shareholder vote. Management's control of the proxy
machinery, along with dispersed shareholders' rational apathy, may
enable management to obtain such votes, but the freeze at least forces
a vote. If, on the other hand, states are engaged in a race to the top,
then management would use charter freezes to reject statutory
innovation favoring shareholders. Management's control of meeting
agendas might prevent shareholders from ever obtaining a vote on
desirable new default provisions.
Unfortunately the "race" debate remains unresolved. The race
to the top thesis rests on the assertion that the market for corporate
securities is relatively efficient. This means that security prices reflect
Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663, 663-70 (1974). The idea of a race to the bottom, along with
the terminology, dates back at least to Justice Brandeis's dissent in Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S.
517, 557-QO (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
128. For an early attack on the race to the bottom thesis, see Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State
Law, Shareholder Protection, & the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251,
258..Q2 (1977); see also Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections
on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913, 915-22
(1982) (questioning the accuracy of the race-to-the-bottom thesis). For a thorough
defense of the race to the top thesis, see ROMANO, supra note 40, 14-17.
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at least all publicly-known information, including each state's
corporate laws. There is strong empirical evidence to support this
version of the efficient markets hypothesis. 129 In addition, a series of
statistical studies ("event studies") have demonstrated that the stock
prices of firms do not generally decline before or after they
reincorporate in Delaware (the state winning the race, up or down)
The fact that shareholders suing
and may actually rise. 130
management of Delaware corporations invariably choose Delaware's
courts, when they have the option of selecting another venue, also
supports the race to the top thesis. 131
One skeptic, however, argues that even capital markets suffer
from some inefficiencies, giving managers the ability to engage in at
least modest levels of self-interested behavior without noticeably
impacting the firm's cost of capital.132 Executives can also use their
control of meeting agendas to package self-interested measures with
"sweeteners," such as special dividends, and thus obtain shareholders'
consent to their own exploitation.
Further, there are some
complications with the event studies cited by race to the top
proponents. Firms often reincorporate either right before or soon
after good news, explaining any rise in price observed on
reincorporation in Delaware.133 It is possible (in a race to the bottom
world) that share prices would rise even more if firms did not
reincorporate in the wake of good news. 134 Note too that, if a race to
the bottom is complete (i.e., all states have roughly similar promanagement corporations statutes), we would not expect to see much
change in share price on reincorporation because firms merely would
be moving from one management-friendly jurisdiction to another. 135
Further complicating the debate, the race need not be entirely to
the top or bottom. On some issues, markets may help shareholders
curtail such behavior. There are strong reasons to believe that
corporate voting rules are efficient.136 On the other hand, even the
129. See, e.g. , RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 290-300 (4th ed. 1991).
130. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 213-15 (surveying event studies and
collecting cites); ROMANO, supra note 40, at 20-22 (summarizing results from event
studies literature and finding support for the race to the bottom thesis).
131. ROMANO, supra note 40, at 41.
132. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435, 1458-67 (1992).
133. See id. at 1449.
134. See id.
135. ld. at 1450.
136. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 70-72 (discussing voting).
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most ardent race to the top advocates admit that the rash of antitakeover measures enacted since the mid-1980s are inefficient and
serve largely to entrench incumbent management. 137
Strong evidence exists that managers of large public corporations
lobbied for these anti-takeover provisions.138 Their enactment
illustrates strikingly just how much statutory amendments are charter
amendments obtained by alternative procedures. "[S]ince most
restrictions imposed by [valid anti-takeover] statutes can be adopted
voluntarily by charter amendment without an authorizing statute,
management's lobbying for legislation clearly implies that it believes
it is easier to convince a state legislature than shareholders of an antitakeover provision's desirability." 139
When management can make an end-run around shareholders
simply by obtaining new statutory provisions, the attractiveness of
charter freezes is obvious. As a first cut, we might posit that
shareholders should freeze out changes only in those areas where
there was a race to the bottom driven by management's influence in
the legislature. Indeed, race to the top advocates have suggested
what amounts to limited charter freezes to address the problem posed
by legislation enacted at the behest of management-the requirement
that shareholders affirmatively opt in to new statutory defaults that
replace mandatory rules, rather than automatic application (as was
the case with almost all anti-takeover statutes):
[W]here important changes in the relationship between
shareholders and management are at issue, legislation that
relaxes mandatory rules should always require an
affirmative shareholder decision to 'opt in' to the change
rather than merely permitting shareholders to opt out. This
will prevent management from extracting more from the
legislative process than it could obtain from the charter
amendment process.140
Romano similarly, but more narrowly, argues that, at least as to antitakeover statutes, legislatures should require firms to take affirmative
steps to opt in, instead of making anti-takeover rules effective for
firms until they affirmatively opt out. 141

137. See id. at 221-22; ROMANO, supra note 40, at 84.
138. See ROMANO, supra note 40, at 80-83.
139. !d. at 84; see also Black, supra note 4, at 568 (agreeing with Romano); William
Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715,752 (1998) (same).
140. Gordon, supra note 95, at 1555.
141. See ROMANO, supra note 40, at 56.
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Limited freezes, however, are prey to the unending creativity of
the legal mind. There is always "the risk that lawmakers will provide
new options that weren't anticipated when a company went public.
[Supermajority voting] provisions can't protect shareholders of
existing companies against this risk."142 A general charter freeze
prevents all creative evasion of shareholder voting requirements in
one fell swoop. Limited freezes simply do not go far enough.
It is possible, at the other extreme, to enact overly stringent
versions of the freeze. Gordon uses the term "freeze" to describe a
charter made absolutely unamendable. 143 Although he does not seem
to contemplate freezing out legislative change, it is conceptually easy
to extend his freeze to preclude legislative as well as shareholder
charter amendments. This is in effect a unanimity rule. If everyone
agrees, they can alter the charter (or merge, or dissolve) at will.
There is nobody left to complain and sue. Gordon and others have
rejected unanimity rules as too inflexible. Because it is so difficult to
obtain unanimous approval for any measure, the firm likely will
forego many desirable statutory amendments in the process of
freezing out undesirable ones.144
A general charter freeze, requiring only a majority (or perhaps a
modest supermajority) vote to include statutory amendments in the
charter, strikes a balance between locking out all, or accepting all,
statutory change. It gives shareholders a chance to accept desirable
amendments and to reject undesirable amendments that benefit only
management. It is important to reiterate that if any portion of the
corporate statute is subject to a race to the bottom (e.g., anti-takeover
measures), freezing only those portions of the charter will not be
effective because management will always be able to find creative,
formally distinct provisions to achieve self-interested ends. A general
charter freeze is thus desirable for public corporations if there is even
partial truth in the race to the bottom hypothesis.
Even if states engage in a race to the top as to every facet of
corporate law, shareholders in public corporations still have two
reasons to enact a general charter freeze: the self-interest of lawyers'
groups and the incompetence of legislatures. The bar is very
influential in drafting corporate laws, nowhere more so than in

142. See Black, supra note 4, at 567--68.
143. See Gordon, supra note 95, at 1575, 1580-81.
144. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1820, 1856-58 (1989);
Gordon, supra note 95, at 1582-84.
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Delaware. 145 Corporate lawyers in many ways have economic
interests at odds with shareholders. They have incentives to favor
rules that require extensive legal planning and cause litigationespecially expensive, protracted litigation. Jonathan Macey and
Geoffry Miller, the first to explore interest group motives in detail in
the context of Delaware law, concluded:
[T]he Delaware bar is likely to be more successful than
other groups in transforming Delaware's competitive
advantage into profits. This group enjoys significant
advantages in organizational structure as well as economies
of scale in obtaining information about the effects of
changes in Delaware law on the demand for corporate
charters and legal services. In addition, the bar is not
plagued with the same start-up costs and free-rider problems
that confront other groups. The bar is not the only interest
group within Delaware that benefits from the state's
dominance in the market for corporate charters, but its gains
are disproportionately high relative to those of the groups
with which it competes.146
To the extent legislation benefits lawyers instead of shareholders, the
freeze may serve as an effective screening device. Managers as well
as shareholders stand to gain by freezing out statutes that impose
excessive legal costs on public corporations.
Finally, shareholders and managers might enact a charter freeze
to protect their corporation from consistently inefficient rules enacted
by an incompetent legislature. Although this is directly at odds with
the purpose of company law, there is no guarantee that every
legislature at all times enacts default rules desired by most firms. The
fact that Delaware's Constitution requires a two-thirds majority in
both houses of its legislature to amend its corporate code may reflect
worry about inappropriate legislation.147 Admittedly, the competition
145. See ROMANO, supra note 40, at 60; Andrew G.T. Moore II, A Brief History of the
General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware and the Amendatory Process, in 1 R.
FRANKLIN BALOTII & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS &
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS H-19 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1997) ("It is a hallmark of the
General Assembly's respect for the expertise of the [Delaware State Bar Association
Section on General Corporate Law] that it will rarely consider or adopt any changes in the
General Corporation Law which have not been sponsored by the Section.").
146. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 522-23 (1987); see also Carney, supra note
139, at 720-28, 737-41 (analyzing incentives of corporate bar in jurisdictions other than
Delaware); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA.
L. REV. 127, 158-62 (1997) (arguing that unanimous decisions by Delaware Supreme
Court benefit Delaware corporate bar).
147. DEL. CONST. art. IX,§ 1.
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among states for public corporation chartering business provides a
powerful market corrective to senseless legislation; firms can always
reincorporate in a state with wiser legislators. 148 Nevertheless, the
freeze offers additional protection when shareholders and executives
of public corporations fear foolish corporate law innovation.
E. Close Corporations & Other Privately-Held Firms

There is little if any state competition for the charters of small,
privately-held firms, because they usually operate in only one state
and the costs of incorporating elsewhere exceed the benefits. 149 Thus,
there is less pressure on legislatures to enact efficient governance
rules, and private firms have more to fear from legislative ineptitude.
Private firms may find charter freezes a helpful defensive measure.
Even if the legislature is competent, its focus on public corporations
often means that close corporations are forgotten step-children. 150 If
legislators tailor corporate law for public corporations, then private
firms have another reason to freeze out automatic change to their
charters and individually evaluate each legislative measure. 151
More generally, if a legislature is incompetent in choosing default
governance rules for small enterprises, the freeze can serve as a signal
of consumer (firm) disapproval. Public firms unhappy with a state's
corporate law simply reincorporate elsewhere (usually in Delaware).
Private firms have no real exit option. If a majority of a given type of
business entity enact charter freezes, a strong signal would be sent to
the legislature that its statute is failing to achieve its fundamental
purpose-providing default rules that most firms desire.
Even if legislatures generally select efficient rules for close firms,
a large minority of these firms may wish to reject many new
provisions. Close firms, to a much greater extent than their public
counterparts, are products of explicit bargaining, with give and take
on a variety of issues. Changes in statutory defaults are likely to
148. Black, supra note 4, at 574-75.
149. Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 10 WASH. U. L.Q.
365, 372-78 (1992).
150. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text {discussing corporate law's
traditional focus on large public corporations).
151. Ayres demonstrates that courts have effectively voided many rules that are
inappropriate for close corporations. Ayres, supra note 149, at 377; see ROMANO, supra
note 40, at 26. Interestingly, legislatures have usually acquiesced, either by enacting a
statute following the innovative decision or by refusing to legislatively reverse the
decision. This solution to the problem of corporate rules unfit for close corporations,
however, raises a similar problem: later courts may inappropriately apply the innovative
rule for close corporations to public corporations.
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upset complex compromises embodied in the charters of closely-held
firms. Vestal demonstrates that the RUPA changes important
fiduciary duty and dissolution rules. 152 Though the Act gives existing
partnerships a window of time to alter their charters before the
RUPA governs them, a looming (mandatory) transition153 will give
partners benefitting under new rules a powerful negotiating position.
Based on the primacy of partners' intent, as embodied in the explicit
and default rules specified in their charter, Vestal argues that
partnerships formed under the UPA should remain governed by the
UPA despite a state's adoption of the RUPA. 154
Vestal's prescribed transition rule is much like a charter freezeit maintains an older set of default rules for existing firms when the
legislature adopts a new set of default rules. Of course a company
could achieve the same effect by including specific rules in its charter
on every issue contemplated in the statute; as discussed earlier, such
explicit terms trump both old and new statutory defaults. 155 Forcing
firms to take this step, however, imposes much of the transactions
cost that company statutes are supposed to eliminate. Charter freezes
allow firms to achieve the same ends with one sentence: "To the
extent permitted by law, this firm elects to be covered by the [entity]
statute as it existed on the date this entity was formed."
As the product of specific bargains, close company charters
exhibit greater heterogeneity than their public counterparts. Thus,
we would expect a higher percent of them to reject statutory defaults.
Even if the legislature chooses perfectly, then, many close firms
whose governance rule preferences diverge from the plurality of their
peers will want to opt out of the statute. Firms especially averse to
statutory innovation are in the best position to identify themselves,
and a charter freeze allows them to plan ahead cheaply. Contract is
the first and best source of company governance rules, and the freeze
is a powerful, forward-looking tool for effecting the parties' intent.
Furthermore, widespread use of charter freezes might give legislators
more room to innovate. When they know that most firms wary of
change have enacted freezes, they can adopt rules desired by the
152. See Allan W. Vestal, Should the RUPA of 1994 Really be Retroactive?, 50 Bus.
LAW. 267,274-79 (1994).
153. REVISED UNIF. P'SIDP Acr § 1006, 6 U.L.A. 122 (1995 & Supp. 2000). The
ULLCA has almost exactly the same transition rule. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr.
§ 1205(b), 6A U.L.A. 507 (1995 & Supp. 2000).
154. See Vestal, supra note 152, at 285-88 (arguing for a "coexistence model," with
UPA governing existing partnerships and RUPA governing partnerships formed in
future).
155. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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plurality that would, absent charter freezes, pose problems to firms
with relatively unusual preferences.
In addition to these special problems, close corporations share
some of public corporations' fears about legislative innovation. Bar
lobbying groups play no less a role in shaping private company law
than they do for public entities. Ribstein and Kobayashi make a
strong case that lawyers involved in drafting and promulgating the
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) included a host
of rules likely to require legal advice and foster litigation. 156 The
RUPA may suffer from the same defects. 157 Neither statute has been
adopted widely. 158 Just as shareholders in public corporations may
worry about the legislative clout of management, minority owners in
close companies may be wary of majority owners' ability to obtain
legislatively what they cannot enact within the firm. Majority owners
can use corporate funds and pooled clout via business groups to lobby
for measures that would require a supermajority vote or for measures
that would look like a breach of fiduciary duty if enacted by an
interested party.
F.

Should the Freeze be the Default Transition Rule for Corporate
Law?

The previous sections concluded that there may be good reasons
to permit both public and private firms to adopt charter freezes. This
Section considers the next natural question: Should the freeze be the
default transition rule inserted into charters? To restate the question,
should firms be required to state explicitly in their charters that they
wish to adopt legislative innovations automatically?
At first blush, this is a shocking default rule. It seems
tantamount to a legislative declaration that "in the future, we are
likely to promulgate company default rules that most firms would not
choose." If the legislature had such serious doubts about its own
wisdom, making freezes the default transition rule would help most
firms block undesirable legal change. It seems unlikely that any
legislature would take such a dim view of its (and its successors')
abilities. Moreover, such an inept legislature might well be better
served by getting out of the business of providing company statutes
altogether.
156. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 963-68 (discussing mandatory fiduciary
duties, liability for wrongful distributions, derivative-like member suits, and the indefinite
standard for dissolution).
157. See Ribstein, Revised Uniform Partnership Act, supra note 45, at 79-81.
158. See supra note 8.
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It is possible, however, that in certain circumstances the freeze
may be a sensible default rule. As in Part TILE, it is helpful to
analyze close and public companies separately. There are at least two
situations in which a legislature confident in its abilities might
rationally select the freeze as a default rule. First, if there is extreme
diversity among close firms, the plurality that favor many default
rules may be quite small. In this case, most firms will wish to reject
most statutory innovation, thus making the charter freeze a sensible
default. Second, we may need to distinguish between relatively
sophisticated close firms that receive legal advice when drafting and
amending their charters and unsophisticated firms that do it on their
own. Lawyers for the former group are in a good position to choose
whether or not to insert a freeze provision based on their familiarity
with clients. Unsophisticated firms, however, are unlikely to think
about the possibility of future legal change. Thus, the legislature
should focus on unsophisticated close firms in deciding whether or
not to select the freeze as a default. If, for example, most close firms
are sophisticated and have a systematic preference for rules that do
not suit unsophisticated firms, the freeze makes sense as a default
rule. Sophisticated firms will contract around the default, and the
freeze will protect unsophisticated parties from new rules unsuited to
their needs. Note that under the stated assumptions, this result is not
limited to freeze provisions: it may be rational to draft the entire
statute to suit the needs of those without expert advice. The
assumptions seem to suggest that there may be a need for two distinct
company statutes. If the legislature provides distinct statutes catering
to the special needs of each group, the freeze rio longer would be a
sensible default rule.
For public companies, again the key empirical question is
whether legislatures generally enact corporate laws favorable to
management (in a race to the bottom) or to owners (in a race to the
top). In a race to the top world, the freeze is an undesirable default,
as it enables management to evade statutory changes that likely
benefit owners. Conversely, under a race to the bottom, the freeze is
an efficient default rule; it prevents managers from using their lackeys
in the legislature to enact provisions allowing them to expropriate
corporate wealth. There is, however, a paradox here. By assumption
in a race to the bottom world, lawmakers would not choose a default
transition rule favorable to shareholders. Instead, they would choose
the existing default-automatic insertion of statutory innovations
(favoring management) into charters.
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Finally, if the bar plays a significant role in shaping company law
to its own advantage, it is unlikely to choose the freeze as the default
transition rule. The freeze helps firms evade statutory amendments
that force them to use lawyers more often (e.g., to comply with
inefficient formalities) and that breed litigation among parties to the
company contract. Such an outcome clearly is not in the legal
profession's self-interest.
CONCLUSION

The last subpart seemingly turns company law on its head. This
Article opened by acknowledging that state business entity statutes
are "off-the-rack" governance rules that most owners prefer. The
state saves each firm the cost of drafting a company charter from
scratch. As the normative analysis of Part III revealed, however,
reality may diverge from this ideal. Instead of adopting efficient rules
that owners would prefer, influential groups (managers, majority
shareholders, and lawyers) warp the contours of company laws.
Under such adverse circumstances, owners will find charter freezes
very appealing.
In the complex and continually evolving legal environment, it is
unlikely that owners face legal changes uniformly harmful to their
interests. It is equally unlikely, however, that changes in company
law always benefit owners. The legal world is more nuanced. States
may be engaged in a race to the top on some public corporate law
issues and a race to the bottom on others. The legal profession may
enact self-interested business entity provisions at some times, while
bowing to firm demand at others.
In addition to these general problems, specific firms may have
their own individuated reasons for fearing amendments to company
laws. Each company is in the best position to gauge the threat posed
by legal change, and to deploy protective legal mechanisms. Part III
argued that there is no policy reason to forbid each firm from
choosing its own transition policy for enabling company law rules.
The freeze is simply one of the choices that firms should have to deal
with potentially harmful alterations to company laws.
Charter freezes, along with other tools to manage the risk of
legal change, are particularly important given the current flux in
company laws. Partnership law may be shifting from the UPA to the
RUPA. Legislatures continue to reshape LLC statutes significantly.
Corporate law is more volatile than in earlier eras. Firms, thus, have
strong grounds to argue that charter freezes are permissible tools for
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insulating themselves from the risks of untoward business entity
legislation.
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